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Revisiting the mind-brain reductionisms: 
Contra dualism and eliminativism
Revisitando os reducionismos mente-cérebro: Contra o 
dualismo e o eliminacionismo
* Nythamar de Oliveira
Abstract: In this paper, I should like to argue against both eliminative 
materialism and substance/property dualism, aiming more specifically 
at the reductionist arguments offered by the Churchlands’ and 
Swinburne’s versions thereof, insofar as they undermine moral beliefs 
qua first-personish accounts dismissed as folk psychology by the 
former, as the latter regards them as supervening on natural events 
extendedly, that is, necessarily both ways of the biconditional linking 
mental and physical substances (for every A-substance x there is a 
B-substance y, such that necessarily if y exists x exists). 
Keywords: Dualism. Eliminativism. Moral Beliefs. Naturalism. Normativity. 
Reductionism.
Resumo: Este artigo procura argumentar contra o eliminacionismo e o 
dualismo de substância ou de propriedade, visando mais especificamente 
os argumentos reducionistas oferecidos pelo casal Churchland e por 
versões de dualismo propostas por Swinburne, na medida em que 
põem em causa as crenças morais enquanto relatos de primeira pessoa, 
desconsiderados como psicologia popular pelos primeiros e como 
supervenientes pelo segundo (como eventos naturais que se estendem 
necessariamente, em ambos os sentidos do bicondicional ligando 
substâncias mentais e físicas: para toda substância-A x existe uma 
substância-B y, de modo que necessariamente se y existe, x existe).
Palavras-chave: Dualismo. Eliminacionismo. Crenças Morais. Naturalismo. 
Normatividade. Reducionismo. 
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1It is well known that the neuroscientific turn in philosophy of mind and language has targeted major versions of Cartesian dualism, 
opposing dichotomies of soul and body, brain and mind, reason and 
emotion. In effect, since the 1950s and 60s, research in neuroscience had 
already shaken apparently insurmountable problems in various models of 
substance dualism, property dualism, and of several others that have 
emerged in the following decades, with alternative proposals to patterns 
of behavior conditioning (behaviorism), theories of identity (between 
mind and brain), the physical states of the brain (physicalism) and 
their causal roles and functions in a complex economy of internal states, 
mediating sensory data inputs and behavioral outputs (functionalism). 
Paul Churchland was associated with the connectionist movement in 
cognitive science in California, in the early 1980s – also known as PDP, 
Parallel Distributed Processing. According to connectionism, the mind 
is analogous to a computational system formed of networks of simple 
processing units, modeled on neurons, so as to offer a sub-symbolic 
alternative to formal symbols’ models, such as Fodor’s “language of 
thought.” Patricia Churchland would thus speak of connectionism as a 
descriptive, materialist critique of functionalism, as the former pursues 
the central empirical hypothesis that cognition itself must be regarded 
as a species of computation:
The computer metaphor is prominent, for a number of reasons . One is 
that a fairly clear sense can be given to the notion of levels of description 
in the case of computers. The machine can be considered to have three 
basic levels of description: the semantic level , the syntactic level , and 
the level of the mechanism... The underlying basis for this hypothesis is 
the idea that reasoning is the model for cognitive information processing 
generally. This means that cognition is largely symbol manipulation 
and that the important relations in cognitive information processing are 
thus the logical relations between the symbols. Now, modern logic has 
provided immense resources for understanding reasoning in terms of 
logical systems: deductive logic, inductive logic, modal logic, decision-
theoretic logic, and so on (ChURChlAND, 1986, p. 350f.).
Paul and Patricia Churchland’s eliminative materialism emerged, in 
effect, as an alternative to behaviorists, structuralists, type-identity and 
reductionist materialists who believe that minds are in some way real, 
albeit not thinking substances, and should be explained by science, but 
without eliminating folk psychology or normativist accounts that evoke 
psychological states. By folk psychology, the Churchlands mean 
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that rough-hewn set of concepts, generalizations, and rules of thumb 
we all standardly use in explaining and predicting human behavior. 
Folk psychology is commonsense psychology – the psychological lore 
in virtue of which we explain behavior as the outcome of beliefs, 
desires, perceptions, expectations, goals, sensations, and so forth. It is 
a theory whose generalizations connect mental states to other mental 
states, to perceptions, and to actions. These homey generalizations are 
what provide the characterization of the mental states and processes 
referred to; they are what delimit the ‘facts’ of mental life and define the 
explananda. Folk psychology is ‘intuitive psychology,’ and it shapes our 
conceptions of ourselves (ChURChlAND, 1986, p. 302).
My contention here is that many neuroscientists and philosophers 
of mind nowadays who embrace physicalism are motivated by their 
correlated refusal of substance and property dualisms without necessarily 
succumbing to determinism or to a reductionist account of naturalism 
– as independently shown by both Antonio Damasio and Jesse Prinz. 
hence, the Churchlands’ eliminativist program tends to be reductionist, 
even though they can make use of folk concepts in the very process 
of eliminating them (ChURChlAND, 1986, p. 336). In contratst, both 
Damasio and Prinz resort to a bodily theory of emotions that takes into 
account what neurophenomenologists call an embodied conception of 
the self or embodied mind, which, moreover, entails social cognition 
as such. Commonsense psychology and folk concepts generated by 
ordinary language use and our everyday resort to beliefs, desires, and 
propositional attitudes turn out to be integrated with the very conception 
of selfhood and subjectivity. As Prinz put it, 
In its most basic form, this [folk psychology] is embodied in our tendency 
to attribute mental states to other creatures and to explain their behavior 
on the basis of those attributions. The tendency is quite robust. We 
attribute mentality to all kinds of things, from people to animals and from 
teddy bears to microorganisms (PRINz, 2002, p. 224).
Prinz goes on to remark that interestingly we don’t ascribe beliefs or 
propositional attitudes to chairs and inanimate things, although humans 
can assign them to animals and things resembling human persons, even 
as we gather empirical evidence against folk psychology in chimps and 
nonhuman animals. The reason is very simple: facial expressions can 
produce emotional experience, which points to emotional contagion and 
intersubjective interaction between first- and third-person standpoints 
in the expression of feelings in humans’ communicating with each other. 
According to Prinz, 
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Seeing others as experiencers just is imagining things from their 
perspective. Simulation is the fundamental form of attribution. Further 
refinements take place after this. For example, we come to recognize that 
others’ perspectives can be unlike ours, we realize that others can harbor 
beliefs that we know to be false, and we come to master propositional-
attitude talk. Readers can consult the literature on mental simulation for 
reasonable accounts of these transitions (PRINz, 2002, p. 226).
For Prinz, Damasio, Searle and those who embrace such a pragmatic 
view of propositional attitudes, the use of personal pronouns (“I,” “you,” 
“she,” “we,” representing a grammatical person within a sentence, 
regardless of any sharp distinction between syntax and semantics) 
refer to a rather fictional conception of the self, following the humean 
empiricist critique of the Cartesian Cogito. Such an embodied view of 
mind and self is, therefore, thoroughly based on empirical findings, at the 
same time that it must take into account intersubjective components and 
phenomenal accounts (including the very idea of narrative in first-person 
accounts). As zahavi and Gallagher put it so well,
It should be obvious that my bodily self-apprehension and the way I live 
my body can be influenced by my social interaction, and by the way my 
body is perceived and apprehended by others – just think of categories 
like gender and race. But perhaps even more basically, social interaction 
is as such an embodied practice (GAllAGhER and zAhAvI, 2008, 
p. 148)
What can be dubbed a neurophenomenological deficit in analytic 
accounts of naturalism points precisely to this neglected aspect of most 
accounts of selfhood that fail to deal with its own phenomenal outlooks 
in the natural attitude or in lifeworldly dealings, prior to any theoretical 
reflection, for instance, in facial recognition, bodily moves or gestures, 
which presuppose social interaction prior to any self-conscious perception. 
After all, it is not so much a solipsistic question, as it has been posed 
by many analytic philosophers as “the problem of other minds” (as if a 
Cogito went from the inner, thinking self towards its outer double, outside 
its body, as it were, in dualistic terminology, “how do I find an access 
to the other”) but it is rather because of bodily interactions of empathy, 
emotions, feeling, communication, and language that consciousness itself 
emerges and makes sociality meaningful. On Damasio’s interpretation, 
social emotions help establish a correlation between practical reason 
and emotion, combining the awareness notion of decision-making and 
planning at different time scales, creating possibilities of interaction 
with the environment and the selection of courses of action, with all 
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processes and steps interconnected. Damasio manages thus to articulate 
the social, intersubjective, and neurobiological processes that explain 
the evolution of the human brain and the emergence of consciousness, 
the “I,” memory, language, subjectivity and their representations 
and creative constructions and carriers of meaning. According 
to Damasio, 
Both basic homeostasis (which is nonconsciously guided) and 
sociocultural homeostasis (which is created and guided by reflective 
conscious minds) operate as curators of biological value. Basic and 
sociocultural varieties of homeostasis are separated by billions of 
years of evolution, and yet they promote the same goal – the survival 
of living organisms – albeit in different ecological niches. That goal is 
broadened, in the case of sociocultural homeostasis, to encompass the 
deliberate seeking of well-being. It goes without saying that the way in 
which human brains manage life requires both varieties of homeostasis 
in continuous interaction. But while the basic variety of homeostasis 
is an established inheritance, provided by everyone’s genome, the 
sociocultural variety is a somewhat fragile work in progress, responsible 
for much of human drama, folly, and hope. The interaction between these 
two kinds of homeostasis is not confined to each individual. There is 
growing evidence that, over multiple generations, cultural developments 
lead to changes in the genome (DAMASIO, 2010, p. 31).
Damasio’s integrated views of emotions and feelings not as “intruders 
in the bastion of reason” but enmeshed in its networks, for worse and for 
better, are revealing: “The strategies of human reason probably did not 
develop, in either evolution or any single individual, without the guiding 
force of the mechanisms of biological regulation, of which emotion and 
feeling are notable expressions” (DAMASIO, 2005, p. xii). Accordingly, 
empathy is to be regarded as a highly flexible, context-dependent 
response to these networks, ultimately leading to cooperation and the 
evolution of social norms, especially fairness norms. Damasio evokes 
the process of a sociocultural homeostasis so as to refer to the social 
and cultural imbalances allowing for the detection of an imbalance at 
a high level of a conscious brain-mind in the stratosphere and not in 
subcortical level. Both Damasio and Prinz succeed thus in integrating 
decisive elements of both neurobiological and sociocultural evolutionary 
processes so as to account for important, distinctive features such as 
working memory, which is a faculty associated with the frontal lobe and 
turns out to be more advanced in our species, as Prinz aptly pointed out, 
as “bigger frontal lobes may have made us better simulators, and hence 
capable of acquiring a folk psychology”(PRINz, 2002, p. 227).
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2let me offer now, by way of contrast, a few comments on Richard 
Swinburne’s seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and 
language, and to the philosophy of neuroscience in his latest work 
Mind, Brain, and Free Will, more particularly on his recasting of the 
mind-brain problem, his critique of physicalism, and his defense of a 
variant of substance/property dualism. Swinburne’s major guiding thesis 
comes down to asserting that physical, material events and conscious, 
mind events (such as beliefs, desires, thoughts, and sensations) are 
not identical, so that “the mental world” cannot be deemed “fully 
deterministic” (SWINBURNE, 2013, p. 202). This is diametrically opposed 
to the Churchlands’ reductionist monist account of moral behavior we just 
surveyed above. Swinburne’s defense of dualism actually dates back to 
his 1986 monograph on The Evolution of the Soul, where the eliminativist 
criticism of folk psychology is dismissed as “an absurd view,” since we 
do have beliefs about how things are in the world, even if many of these 
beliefs turn out to be inconsistent or misleading:
We are aware of our thoughts as we experience them, and beliefs... 
are not just events postulated to explain public behaviour, but ones to 
which the subject has privileged access. The absurd conclusion follows 
from two premisses – one plausible but contestable neurophysiological 
claim that brain sententialism is false, and the other one identity theory 
(that any mental events are identical with physical events). If we reject 
identity theory, as I have given plenty of other reason to do in the text, we 
are not saddled with the absurd conclusion whatever neurophysiology 
might discover. And if the brain processes underlying logical thought 
do not exhibit sentential structure while thought processes do often 
exhibit sentential structure, that seems to provide a yet further reason 
for rejecting identity theory (SWINBURNE, 1997, p. 321).
I would like to revisit here some of the features of this classical 
problem which resists any clear-cut solution, in light of Swinburne’s 
recasting of substance and property dualisms. hence, I am assuming 
that the brain-mind problem is analogous to the nature-nurture pickle, 
in the sense of a predicament like a chicken-egg question, not so much 
to sort out which one comes first but which conditioning is more basic 
and takes primacy over the other. Even though it could seem trivial to 
realize that there are no mental events without brain processes, just 
like neurobiological evolution (nature) would intuitively seem to be prior 
to social, cultural evolution (nurture), the fact that human cultural and 
civilizational processes have transformed nature throughout the centuries 
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and millennia just attest to the difficulties involved in the brain-mind 
pickle (PRINz, 2002). In a US idiomatic expression, if you are in a pickle, 
then you are in a difficult position, or have a problem to which no easy 
answer can be found –so that happens to be case with the brain-mind 
problem, following a neuroscientific turn in the recasting of the body-
soul problem.
Swinburne starts from the basic assumption that mental events 
(consisting in the instantiation of mental properties – sensations, 
thoughts, purposes, desires, and beliefs) are distinct from physical 
events (such as brain events), although in causal interaction with them. 
As expected, ontology is the starting point for his mapping of concepts 
and theoretical framework: 
the whole history of the world can be told with our familiar system 
of categories: substances, properties, and times. I understand by a 
substance a particular concrete object: my desk, that person, the photon 
(particle of light) emitted from this light source which landed on this 
screen, and so on. Substances may have other substances as parts. My 
desk has its drawers as parts of it; and it can exist (it is logically possible) 
independently of all other things of its kind (i.e. all other substances) 
apart from its parts; and those parts have very many electrons, protons, 
neutrons, etc. as their parts. Substances exist all-at-once. Whenever they 
exist, they exist totally (SWINBURNE, 2013, p. 4).
These lines might prompt many of us to draw comparisons to Edmund 
husserl’s parts-whole formal ontology, namely, the recasting of leibniz’s 
monadology as an alternative third way to avoid both Descartes’s 
substance dualism and Spinoza’s holistic monism. Moreover, I think that 
one might even spot a neurophenomenological deficit in both normative 
and naturalist theories that fail to account, respectively, for neural 
correlates in first-personish reconstructions of social action (as in most 
critical-theoretical approaches of second and third generations of the 
so-called Frankfurt School to social psychology) or in naturalist theories 
of sociality that fail to take into account the irreducibility of semantics 
to syntax and the former’s pertaining to phenomenal consciousness of 
aboutness and what’s-it-likeness (as in the Churchlands’ eliminative 
materialist research program). Although I won’t pursue this point 
here, we may think of habermas’s critical, normative reconstruction 
of subjectivity as he conceives of cognitive- and moral-psychological 
development as a rationalization of the structures of consciousness, as 
the conventional perspective can be replaced by the postconventional 
perspective, for instance, when adolescents consciously grow 
and reflect upon their own justifications of moral, normative 
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principles (hABERMAS, 1979). In the final analysis, it is quite 
understandable that neuroscientists overall and neuropsychologists 
in particular would refer to physical or natural ontology as they deal 
with real, natural beings, their properties and events that can be 
described and explained as physical phenomena  – without any resort 
to supernatural or metaphysical discourse. For physicalists, materialists, 
and naturalists it suffices to take ontology as the real, phenomenal 
realm of beings, entities, phenomena, and events as they appear, come 
into being or exist, necessarily, possibly or contingently, very much as 
traditionally and broadly conceived, as the study of what there is in 
the sense of real, objective existence. Naturalists like John Searle have 
shown, however, that epistemic and ontological takes on objectivity 
and subjectivity are not as straightforward for philosophers, say, when 
contrasting events or phenomena studied by so-called “hard sciences” 
with the social reality or institutions that are examined by social 
scientists, precisely because of the irreducibility of the phenomenal, 
self-conscious perspective of the first person who experiences pain, 
feels cold or exchanges goods with other human beings in their social 
dealings (SEARlE, 1984, 1995). Searle’s oft-evoked Chinese room 
thought-experiment helps explain the impossibility of physicalist 
accounts of feelings, sentiments, and emotions without resorting also 
to first-personal accounts that presuppose interpretation and meaning 
(hence, semantics, as opposed to syntax), when we test our concepts 
by imagining what it would be like if such and such were the case, and 
realize that computation by itself cannot be equated with thinking. In 
this sense, it can be argued that the social, intersubjective dimension 
of human selfhood, in its correlated capabilities of conscious reflexivity 
and autonomy, are the best way to account for the limits that humans 
impose on the reduction of the performance of certain tasks to their 
functions or algorithmic efficiency, as in the pursuit of a good life and 
human flourishing, not only to ourselves (self-fulfilling lives) but also to 
others (sociability). It has been my working hypothesis that by calling 
into question whether social, cultural conditioning can be actually 
undermined by neurobiological conditioning alone, it remains to be 
seen how positive social feedback drives people to interact on social 
media and, the other way around, whether use of social media ends 
up changing the way positive social feedback is actually processed 
by the brain. Since most social thinkers tend to identify sociality with 
intersubjectivity (for instance, the fact that shared beliefs or social norms 
are common to individuals belonging to the same social group or set 
of individuals), one may think of social institutions (broadly conceived 
so as to include not only the state, governmental, political, economic, 
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and legal structures, but also the family, civil society, organizations, 
associations, and social grouping of all sorts) very much by analogy 
with the way one learns how to function in a natural language (sharing 
a grammar, phonetics etc), usually without paying much attention to 
it (esp. mother tongue for native speakers, as analogous to the way 
one has been socialized into being Amish in Amish country). Recent 
evolutionary research on human sociality and the social brain render 
solipsistic accounts untenable, both in naturalistic and substantialist 
terms.
3
At any rate, according to Swinburne, mental events consist in the 
instantiations of properties in the immaterial substance, which has been 
traditionally termed soul, anima, as the seat par excellence of reflexivity, 
interiority, and self-consciousness. Accordingly, humans and nonhuman 
animals alike (esp. “higher” animals) are said to consist of two parts, 
the essential part (the soul) and a contingent part (their body). Since 
Aristotle, we think of humans as peculiarly distinct vis à vis other 
nonhuman animals – nowadays, esp. higher animals – because of the 
former’s ability to speak and reason (logon echon) logically and morally, 
hence the very conception of free will has been an integrated system of 
beliefs and desires, taken together with the reflective capacity to judge, 
assuming that memory and perception were found among other animals. 
But we must unpack how these categories of substances, properties, and 
times concur to pick out mental events and brain processes. According to 
Swinburne, “an event as either some substance (or substances, or event 
or events) having a certain property (more formally, the instantiation of 
a property in some substance or substances, or event or events) at a 
certain time, or the coming into existence or the ceasing to exist of some 
substance at some time” (SWINBURNE, 2013, p. 6). Once we agree that 
substances, properties, and events are basic constituents of the world 
and once we give in to his principle of credulity – i.e., “what seems to 
us to be the case probably is the case, absent any counter-evidence” 
(SWINBURNE, 2013, p. 42f) –, Swinburne proceeds to persuade us that the 
soul qua substance is, after all, the essential part of our being insofar as it 
can exercise causal power over the body, and more importantly, free from 
deterministic causes in such a way as to render us morally responsible 
for what we do. It seems quite problematic to assume that by confining 
ontology to existence (as opposed to, say, being and modes of being), 
Swinburne would succeed in avoiding Platonic realism and its correlated 
semantics, according to which all nouns do refer to existent entities (in a 
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transcendent realm of forms), or other variants of general metaphysical 
or ontology that might undermine his contention that substances have 
properties, as opposed to one single substance (monism). hence, when 
Swinburne arguably points out that “philosophers and scientists have 
made claims about what is ‘possible’ in this area, such as ‘it is not 
possible for a person to exist without a body’ or ‘necessarily all mental 
events supervene on physical events’” to add that “whether that is 
true depends on what is meant by ‘possible’ and ‘necessarily’,” he 
seems to be committed to a particular semantic-ontological framework 
(SWINBURNE, 2013, p. 4ff). Thus, in order to account for the soul’s 
interaction on the body and material things, Swinburne strategically 
adopts the following extended notion of supervenience: “A-substances 
supervene on B-substances iff necessarily for every A-substance x there is 
a B-substance y, such that necessarily if y exists x exists” (SWINBURNE, 
2013, p. 21). While supervenience per se simply means that properties 
of type A are supervenient on properties of type B if and only if two 
objects cannot differ with respect to their A-properties without also 
differing in their B-properties, its hardest version extends the notion 
so as to comprise all properties (mental and physical) in a correlated 
implication, as Swinburne contends. Precisely because of his ontological 
commitments, Swinburne strongly argues against any “restriction of 
the mental to the sensory” (SWINBURNE, 2013, p. 98), citing David 
Chalmers’s property dualism (akin to his own version of event dualism), 
according to which there are “both physical and non-physical features of 
the world. The falsity of logical supervenience implies that experience is 
fundamentally different in kind from any physical feature” (ChAlMERS, 
1996, p. 124). One of the reasons why Swinburne’s case for dualism 
seem to fail to deliver the normative grounds promised by his otherwise 
highly original and critical account of property dualism is, perhaps, 
to be found in its lack of commitment to what Chalmers dubbed “the 
hard problem of consciousness” (ChAlMERS, 1995). As R.D. Ellis put 
so well, “the main point of the hard problem is that, even if we could 
discover the ‘neural correlates of consciousness,’ we still would not have 
answered the ‘harder’ question: Why do those physical events exhibit 
the property of consciousness, whereas other physical events do not?” 
(GIORDANO and GORDIJN, 2010, p. 66). Even though these remarks 
seem to address the naturalist horn of the dilemma, the second horn 
turns out to render problematic the very meaning of normativity caught 
between the subjectivism of first-personal accounts and the absolutism 
of third-person accounts (esp. absolute principles and divine command 
theories as in the Euthyphro dilemma). Precisely because objective 
moral values do not appear to be part of the natural order, critics like 
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Terence horgan and Mark Timmons have convincingly argued that we 
should keep in mind that one can be an irrealist about a given body of 
discourse (e.g., moral discourse, or mental discourse) without being 
an eliminativist –“someone who regards the discourse as defective, 
and needing replacement or elimination”(hORGAN & TIMMONS, 1993, 
p. 266). horgan goes on to suggest that a reasonable, broad option is 
“preservative irrealism, which would treat higher-order discourse as 
quite legitimate and perhaps indispensable, while also repudiating its 
apparent ontological commitments. Instrumentalism, of course, is one 
form of preservative irrealism; instrumentalist views typically attribute 
utility to the given body of discourse, but deny that it expresses genuine 
truths” (hORGAN, 1991, p. 318). This has been particularly useful in 
race, gender, and ethnic studies. Thus, the Rawlsian distinction between 
concepts and conceptions (to oppose his own particular conception of 
justice as fairness to competing concepts of justice, such as folk concepts 
of a sense of justice and theoretical accounts, as “the concept is the 
meaning of a term, while a particular conception includes as well the 
principles required to apply it”)1 has recently been evoked by Joshua 
Glasgow’s A Theory of Race (2009), which sought to recast the normative 
grounds of the semantic-ontological problem of race, by propounding 
Racial Reconstructionism as a third-way substitutionism between the 
Anti-Realism of eliminativist conceptions of race (i.e., that we should 
eliminate race-thinking entirely, as espoused by Appiah, Blum, Corlett, 
zack) and the Realism of anti-eliminativists who advocate some form of 
Racial Conservationism (Du Bois, Outlaw, Sundstrom, Taylor)2. After all, 
according to Glasgow, “the race debate is about whether to eliminate or 
conserve contemporary, public, folk racial discourse.” In order to make 
sense of folk concepts of race, however, specialists in racial theory tend to 
rely on what historical experts mean by “race” (Glasgow, 2009, p. 42). In 
order to avoid normative and empirical gaps between the thick semantics 
of scientific, biological accounts and the thin conceptions of social 
constructionists, Glasgow resorts to a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium 
that seeks to strike a normative balance between our theoretical, 
categorical, and possible case intuitions to warrant modifications in our 
theories (for example, when evident mixed-race identities push us to 
eliminate the one-drop rule), and vice-versa, as our policies and practices 
are affected by our theoretical conceptions. The guiding intuition is that: 
1 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism. Expanded edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005, 
p. 14, n. 15. Rawls remarks that he borrowed this distinction from h.l.A. hart’s The Concept 
of Law.
2 Joshua Glasgow, A Theory of Race. New York: Routledge, 2009.
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P1. Empirical sciences (esp. biology and anthropology) show that the 
concept of race is wrong or misleading.
P2. There is racism (in Brazil, in the US and elsewhere).
N1. Racism is morally wrong. 
Glasgow proceeds then to propose a highly original Folk Empirical 
Theory, so as to deal with the semantic indeterminacy of race and provide 
the normative grounds of any political activism for those who publicly 
denounce racism and racist policies. Even if one grants that it is not a 
matter of simply replacing one term with another, say, politically correct, 
in order to denounce racial slurs and various forms of racism, there 
remains the semantic-ontological problem of the social interactions and 
use of language in intersubjective, everyday practices, dealings, and 
communication – what has been identified, since husserl and Schutz, 
with the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and practical interplays of the familiar and 
the strange (Heimwelt and Fremdwelt) in a phenomenology of sociality, 
thoroughly cultural and historical (STEINBOCk, 1996, 198). It seems that 
a crucial social, phenomenological deficit betrays thus the normative gap 
between Glasgow’s articulation of ontology and semantics – to my mind, 
a frequent blind spot in many analytic accounts. Whether racial terms 
purport to refer to natural or social kinds, so that the ontological is said 
to be prior to the normative, whether the semantic is manifest prior to 
the ontological and our task mainly consists in establishing normativity 
and finding an adequate ontological and semantic framework, so as to 
eliminate biological pretensions and semantic distortions, we still have 
to face the social reality of racism. It seems, instead, that racism must 
be tackled from the three fronts at once: ontological, intersubjective, and 
semantic-linguistic.
4
To be granted, Swinburne carefully distinguish beliefs and intentions 
as continuing mental states that do not by themselves entail any physical 
events involving the believer or agent, as opposed to, say, desires 
and dispositions to do actions: “In that they exist over periods of time 
during which they are totally absent from my consciousness, they are 
clearly continuing mental states and not – like intentions in action – 
conscious events” (SWINBURNE, 2013, p. 83f). Now, physicalists like 
Damasio and Prinz have convincingly argued that reason, emotions, and 
decision-making processes can be articulated in terms of empirical and 
philosophical language, in that cognitive feelings and a reflective level 
are integrated with noncognitive features of emotions and preferences, 
particularly the so-called “primary emotions” and “gut reactions.” For 
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one, Damasio has decisively contributed to ongoing interdisciplinary 
research in cognitive sciences, neurophilosophy, neurobiology of mind 
and behavior, particularly at the crossroads of emotions, decision-
making, memory, communication, creativity, and consciousness as 
neurophysiological phenomena that call into question reductionist 
approaches. Indeed, the publication of his Descartes’ Error, in 1994, 
started off a decisive turning point not only in neurology, psychiatry, 
neuroscience, and cognitive psychology, but also in the philosophy 
of mind and language, as it undertook a radical critique of Cartesian 
dualism, opposing dichotomies of soul and body, brain and mind, reason 
and emotion (DAMASIO, 1994). Since the 1950s and 60s, research in 
neuroscience had already shaken apparently insurmountable 
problems in various models of dualism and of several others that 
emerged in the following decades, with alternative proposals to patterns 
of behavior conditioning (behaviorism), theories of identity (between 
mind and brain), the physical states of the brain (physicalism) and 
their causal roles and functions in a complex economy of internal states, 
mediating sensory data inputs and behavioral outputs (functionalism), as 
well as the materialistic reductionisms that supposedly eliminate folk 
psychology and normative accounts that allude to psychological 
states (eliminative materialism). Damasio’s work fostered thus a fruitful 
dialogue between neuroscientists and philosophers of mind, especially 
within neurophilosophy and cognitive sciences, as attest seminal works 
by Searle, Gazzaniga, and Prinz. Of particular concern is their recasting 
of the “social brain” problem, as Damasio and Prinz assume that the 
philosophical underpinnings of cognitive and moral decisions are at 
the center of discussions about human nature, in that self-conscious 
morality-cum-sociality evolves as one of the elements that distinguish 
humans from superior primates and other nonhuman animals. As early 
as the 1990s, independent work in neuroscience and cognitive sciences 
fostered a fruitful dialogue between neuroscientists and philosophers of 
mind, especially within moral neurophilosophy, as moral decisions occupy 
a central place in defining the human being, at the heart of decisions 
that define us in relation to cultural, social problem-solving, relationship 
issues, and personal and political choices that ultimately help us set 
the “self” in everyday relations to ouselves and to the others and within 
a particular milieu. Damasio established then the correlation between 
practical reason and emotion, combining the awareness notion of decision-
making and planning at different time scales, creating possibilities of 
interaction with the environment and the selection of courses of action, 
with all processes and steps interconnected. Damasio manages thus 
to articulate the social, intersubjective, and neurobiological processes 
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that explain the evolution of the human brain and the emergence of 
consciousness, the “I” – as a first-personish self, a reflected-upon “me” 
and third-personish accounts of other selves –, memory, language, 
subjectivity, and their representations and creative constructions and 
carriers of meaning. According to Damasio, 
Both basic homeostasis (which is nonconsciously guided) and 
sociocultural homeostasis (which is created and guided by reflective 
conscious minds) operate as curators of biological value. Basic and 
sociocultural varieties of homeostasis are separated by millions of 
years of evolution, and yet they promote the same goal – the survival 
of living organisms – albeit in different ecological niches. That goal is 
broadened, in the case of sociocultural homeostasis, to encompass the 
deliberate seeking of well-being. It goes without saying that the way in 
which human brains manage life requires both varieties of homeostasis 
in continuous interaction. But while the basic variety of homeostasis 
is an established inheritance, provided by everyone’s genome, the 
sociocultural variety is a somewhat fragile work in progress, responsible 
for much of human drama, folly, and hope. The interaction between these 
two kinds of homeostasis is not confined to each individual. There is 
growing evidence that, over multiple generations, cultural developments 
lead to changes in the genome (DAMASIO, 2010, p. 31).
5
Indeed, since Gazzaniga (1985) formulated the problem for the first 
time in the 1980s, the “neural substrates” of social behavior and cognition 
have not yet been completely understood. Moreover, studies in humans 
and other primates have revealed different neural structures that play 
a decisive role in the construction of social behavior: the amygdala, the 
ventromedial frontal cortices and the right somatosensory cortex, among 
other structures, which seem to mediate perceptual representations of 
socially relevant stimuli. These studies made it possible to develop the 
Social Brain hypothesis, according to which the restrictions on the size 
of the social group arise from the ability of information processing in the 
brain, especially among primates, so that the neocortex eventually play 
an important role in social evolution that leads us to present complex 
sociality. Thus the Dunbar number was first proposed in the 1990s by 
British anthropologist Robin Dunbar (1998), who found a correlation 
between primate brain size and average social group size. however, 
even such a proposal raises a number of interpretations on how this 
relationship is mediated. For Dewey, who influenced the normative-
reconstructive approach of social thinkers like Rawls, habermas, and 
honneth, thought is necessarily symbolic and all symbolism is necessarily 
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social, therefore, the mind is always already social: there are sources of 
expertise outside the individual, insofar as we have to live from birth to 
death in a social world of people and artifacts, which is largely the result 
of what has been done and transmitted from previous human activities 
in concert – in cultural traditions, through linguistically and socially 
mediated contexts of meaning3. When this fact is ignored, experience 
is treated as if it were something that happens exclusively within the 
body and mind of a lonely individual or disembodied self. According to 
Dewey, experience does not occur in a vacuum, but it always presupposes 
an intersubjective externality to an individual, which gives rise to the 
very experience itself within a social world. Certainly, not all sociality 
can be reduced to brains, nor can their conceptualizations be socially 
determined. According to social epistemology, the emphasis on the 
primacy of emotions and the importance of common notions are not always 
equally crucial to characterize the formation of knowledge, agreement 
and disagreement between epistemic peers in decision-making groups. 
The social dimension that is being emphasized in discussions of social 
intellect, culminating with the notion of Machiavellian intelligence 
and its presence in the world of primates, is the individual’s ability 
to interact successfully with the social groups in order to predict and 
manipulate human behavior, making and breaking promises, and so 
on. The energy requirements of such a complex situation are ultimately 
presented as responsible for the large size of the primate brain, so that 
some evolutionary anthropologists and researchers in related fields 
postulated the hypothesis of Machiavellian intelligence and the social 
brain hypothesis (DUNBAR, 1998, p. 183). Moreover, the concept of 
social brain is not reducible to the individual manifestations of a social 
world around us because the “brain architecture” reflects rather than 
forms its social organization, language and culture. It is against such 
a complex semantic context that can be investigated the processes 
of moral decision-making and ethical implications that materialize 
in everyday life and social media, as measured in neuroimaging 
experiments. Beyond the culturalist, rationalist and modular approaches 
to language, this research will thus help us figure out how language 
and cross-cultural identities (including gender, ethnic, social, political 
etc) function in social interactions comprising diverse fields such as 
pragmatics, neurolinguistics, and neurosemantics, and the fact that in 
order to function socially beliefs are inevitably called for (GAzzANIGA, 
2005, p. 146).
3 Cf. Peter Godfrey-Smith, Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature. Cambridge University 
Press, 1998, p. 105.
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So a first set of questions that addresses Swinburne’s recasting 
of substance/property dualism can be thus formulated: since a 
phenomenological notion of an embodied mind or of a minded body does 
not entail an endorsement of some kind of Cartesian materialism, as if 
we were simply getting rid of the soul (or the mind, for that matter), how 
about embracing a more explicit phenomenology of mind? As Swinburne 
interestingly remarks in his own criticisms of misleading, reductionist 
interpretations of libet’s experiments: 
In other cases it does not seem to us that we are choosing without being 
caused to choose as we do, and so we should not believe that we are then 
making an uncaused choice. The phenomenology of deciding between 
rival possible actions, ones which are not determined by our mental 
states (our existing desires and beliefs with their relative strengths), is 
so different from the phenomenology of doing the everyday things we 
do intentionally, that we should expect the underlying brain processes 
to be similarly different (SWINBURNE, 2015, p. 201f.).
After all, an agent has free will, as Swinburne goes on to assert, 
“insofar as the agent acts intentionally without their intentions being 
fully determined by prior causes”. Or as Swinburne put it, “having an 
intention in making” such and such is equivalent to ‘having an intention 
which the subject believes causes him or her to make them’ rather than 
– as ordinarily – ‘having an intention which causes the subject to make 
them’.” (SWINBURNE, 2015, p. 80f.). The irreducibility of first-personish 
accounts of beliefs and actions in response to phenomenological, 
normative challenges (esp. when dealing with intentionality, aboutness, 
and consciousness) that avoid trivial conceptions of normativity and 
naturalism might help us avoid the deterministic attempts to reduce the 
sense of normativity, say, as in Jennifer hornsby’s conception of Naive 
Naturalism, according to which in order to avoid both physicalist and 
Cartesian claims about the mind-body problem, we ought to return to 
common sense and folk psychology as they implicitly endorse normative 
and first-personish beliefs (hORNSBY, 1997, p. 214). In a nutshell, is it the 
case that supervenience of moral properties on non-moral properties must 
be analogous to supervenience of substances, as Swinburne extended 
kim’s conception so as to account for natural, physical phenomena 
without resorting to deterministic approaches such as the identity 
theory? That being the case, how does property or event dualism avoid 
the criticisms raised against functionalism? As Swinburne saw the 
problem, functionalists claim (to use his own terminology) “that what 
makes any property a property of a kind which [Swinburne has] called 
‘pure mental property’ is that events with that property have a certain 
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function in a person’s life of thought and behavior, and in particular tend 
to have certain kinds of causes and effects (in or outside the brain)” 
(SWINBURNE, 2015, p. 94). Granted, I can see that this strategy will be 
very helpful in keeping moral normativity separate from naturalism or 
physicalism. As Swinburne put it so bluntly, “Moral beliefs as such, I 
suggest, like all value beliefs and unlike other beliefs, motivate us. I could 
not believe that some action was really morally good to do (as opposed 
to being what other people call ‘morally good’) and yet not see myself as 
having a reason for doing it” (SWINBURNE, 2015, p. 178).
6
Now, still relating to property supervenience and causation, we might 
raise the question of how to interpret the correlations between mental 
and neural phenomena discovered by brain science and psychology since 
their beginnings. Brain research suggests that there is a high degree of 
covariation between mental states and brain states. This view, however 
familiar, raises more questions than it tends to be aware of, and we may 
as well pick out just three of them, following Prinz (2002, p. 71ff; 2004a; 
2012, p. 168f):
(1) If causal relations are at all possible in a transphysical context, 
how do they have to be conceived? 
(2) how far are “passive” mental events causally dependent on brain 
processes? 
(3) how far are “active” mental events causally relevant to brain 
events? 
Whereas the first question is largely a challenge to philosophical 
analysis, the two other questions are a challenge, and an opportunity, 
for a coordinated effort of all contributing disciplines, including the 
neurosciences. Since Swinburne admits that instead of an event dualism, 
it could be that the public world (not merely our description of it) contains 
some other dualism (an ‘aspect’-dualism, for example) which turns out 
to be just a different way of describing the same feature of the world 
as does ‘event-dualism’. Now, could we stretch this to go so far as to 
say that perhaps event dualism allows for a perspectivism that avoids 
an ontological dualism, like in kant’s noumenal-phenomenal dualism 
understood as transcendental perspectives rather than ontological 
realms? Isn’t the case that kant himself also made room for agent 
causation, as opposed to inanimate events (e.g. the motion of billiard 
balls), allowing for the first-person account of autonomous, self-legislating 
selves that cannot be reducible to third-person, descriptive accounts 
precisely because of their peculiar practical faculty to initiate a series 
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of events in nature? Indeed, for many physicalists, the physical is 
sufficient to generate the mental and that a further causal contribution 
(say, of something supernatural) is not called for. In the case of criticisms 
raised against kantian-inspired conceptions of freedom, this amounts to 
either turning freedom into some entity (in an ontological realm, as over 
against nature) or into some subjective illusion. For kant, it is of course 
neither, as freedom remains a regulative idea or a mental representation 
to regulate reasoning itself when dealing with moral issues, as the “I 
think” essentially involves activity on the part of the subject, as an 
expression of the subject’s free activity or “spontaneity”4. Although the 
causal sufficiency of the physical cannot rule out a supernatural influence 
categorically, such an influence would be redundant. It would not be 
needed to explain the existence and functioning of the mind. All in all, one 
cannot speak of naturalist normativity or normative naturalism without a 
certain embarrassment. And yet, as over against traditional conceptions 
that regard naturalism as merely descriptive, as opposed to prescriptive 
accounts of normativity, it has become more and more common nowadays 
to challenge such a clear-cut division of labor, as naturalists like Millikan 
(MIllIkAN, 2005, p. 79-82) assign normative force to the biological 
concept of function and normativists like korsgaard tend to assume that 
human psychology is naturally normative: “whatever confers a normative 
status on our actions – whatever makes them right or wrong – must 
also be what motivates us to do or avoid them accordingly, without any 
intervening mechanism” (kORSGAARD, 2010, p. 16). To be sure, both 
views could be regarded as simply recasting the externalist-internalist 
debate over the problems of teleology, intentionality, motivation and 
carrying out an action supposed to be moral. Once again, Damasio’s 
integrated views of emotions and feelings not as “intruders in the bastion 
of reason” but enmeshed in its networks, for worse and for better, are 
revealing: “The strategies of human reason probably did not develop, in 
either evolution or any single individual, without the guiding force of the 
mechanisms of biological regulation, of which emotion and feeling are 
notable expressions” (DAMASIO, 2005, p. xii). Accordingly, empathy is a 
highly flexible, context-dependent response to these networks, ultimately 
leading to cooperation and the evolution of social norms, especially 
fairness norms. Damasio evokes thus the process of a sociocultural 
homeostasis so as to refer to the social and cultural imbalances allowing 
for the detection of an imbalance at a high level of a conscious brain-
mind in the stratosphere and not in subcortical level. Damasio’s takes 
on emotions and feelings within an integrated 4EA-view of cognition 
 
4 Immanuel kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft B 132.
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(embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and affective), very much 
like Prinz’s, allow for a homeostatic understanding of the development 
of moral rules, laws, and justice systems (very much like an effect of a 
wide reflective equilibrium), as a response to the detection of imbalances 
caused by social behaviors that make endanger individuals and the group. 
The cultural devices created in response to the imbalance aim to restore 
the equilibria of individuals and the group. So people are capable of 
social cooperation and empathy, but they can be also callous, indifferent 
and socialized into schadenfreude (finding pleasure in others’ pain) –the 
social, cognitive, and neural mechanisms underlying empathy and that 
may help to alleviate humanity’s deepest tragedies and facilitate its 
greatest triumphs. So this intricate connection of the body to emotions 
is related to homeostasis, which can be rethought of as the machinery 
regulating life that also has to do with the development of culture. This 
development manifests the same goal as the form of homeostasis. It 
reacts to the detection of an imbalance in the process of life and seeks 
to correct it within the limits of human biology and the physical and 
social environment. The contribution of economic and political systems, 
as well as, for example, the development of medicine, are a response 
to functional problems that occur in the social space and require a 
correction in this space, so that will not undermine the regulation of vital 
individuals that constitute the group. We come thus full circle within 
a broad understanding of wide reflective equilibrium, in sociocultural 
homeostatic and social-ontological terms, allowing for intersubjective 
and linguistic interactions and co-constitution of meanings.
7
last but certainly not least, since Swinburne also pursued theology 
(1959-60), besides his undergraduate (1954-57) and graduate (1957-
59) studies in philosophy at the University of Oxford, one wonders how his 
event dualism might respond to the ongoing science wars and evolution 
wars in the US, especially those opposing the scientific community and 
fundamentalist and conservative Christian theologians and believers. As 
we all know, this creationism-evolution debate is not a real problem in 
Catholic and moderate, liberal protestant theology (or progressive, reform 
Judaism for that matter). Now, within Swinburne’s research program, 
the principles of credulity and testimony could be evoked to assess the 
belief, say, in the inerrancy of the Bible when dealing with creationism 
and miracles? Would they go so far as to follow Alvin Plantinga in holding 
that since belief in the theist, personal God is properly basic, then it 
would seem that belief in inerrancy would be, within the circumstances of 
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Christian faith, a properly basic belief as well? I am raising these questions, 
out of curiosity but also with a view to testing the coherence of Swinburne’s 
dualism, as many issues relating to the composition of the hebrew Bible 
and of the New Testament have led to conjectures and documentary 
hypotheses that rely on probability, for instance, that there is new evidence 
to assert, nowadays, that it is more likely (probable) that the Torah was 
composed much later than sooner (conservative traditional chronologies 
dated back to 1,200 BCE) and that much of the whole hebrew Bible was 
written from the seventh through the 5th century BCE (according to many 
researchers, such as Israeli leading archaeologist Israel Finkelstein). So 
just like creationists who stick to a Young Earth hypothesis (between 
6,000 and 10,000 years) to oppose the Big Bang (over 13.7 billion years, 
with the Earth’s age estimated in about 4.5 billion years), conservatives 
and fundamentalists still refuse to accept scientific contributions (e.g., 
archaelogy and innovative methods for dating) in their own handling of 
Scriptures. Couldn’t the principles of credulity and testimony, in this case, 
turn out to be quite misleading? After all, substance, property, and event 
dualisms could easily fall back into some subtle Manichean doctrine of 
supernatural powers intervening in the natural cosmos, just like property 
dualists could still hold that some of our mental states have immaterial 
properties, even though we ourselves cannot be solely identified with 
immaterial souls wholly distinct from our bodies and natural properties. 
There seems to be a subtle reduction at work whenever one refrains from 
seeking a natural explanation for some unknown phenomenon, such as 
the “mystery of consciousness,” as what struck Swinburne as absurd in 
the Churchlands’ eliminativist thrust could also be regarded as a refusal 
to allow for a cognitive phenomenology. In effect, that is precisely how 
Prinz has shown that any theory of consciousness must meet all seven 
desiderata: qualia, what makes mental states conscious or first-order 
consciousness availability, a cognitivist critique of global workspace 
theory, a view of function as more basic than high-level interpretation, 
the possibility of selfless experience, unity levels of consciousness with 
multivevel integration, phenomenal knowledge and a neurofunctional 
approach. Accordingly, 
a theory of consciousness should deliver an account of what qualia are 
and how to account for differences between qualitative states... On an 
adequate theory, qualitative character should be located in states that 
represent appearances, and those states have their character only when 
they are conscious... conscious states are located at an intermediate 
level of representation within hierarchically organized sensory systems, 
so that consciousness arises when and only when intermediate-level 
representations are modulated by attention (PRINz, 2012, p. 223).
N. de Oliveira – Revisiting the mind-brain reductionisms
382 Veritas  |  Porto Alegre, v. 61, n. 2, maio-ago. 2016, p. 363-385
Therefore, a mitigated conception of social constructionism succeeds 
in avoiding the various versions of dualism and still allowing for a 
normative reconstruction of the so-called social brain hypothesis, so 
that phenomenal consciousness and first-personish accounts, including 
beliefs, desires, intentions, and propositional attitudes, cannot be 
ultimately eliminated by physicalism. By focusing on the relation between 
naturalism and normativity, one might avoid the reduction of either to 
the other, by stressing the inevitability of bringing in the two other poles 
of the semantic correlation whenever dealing with ontology, language, 
and intersubjectivity. As Prinz’s takes on transformation naturalism and 
concept empiricism allow for an interesting rapprochement between 
social epistemology and critical-theorical accounts of social evolution, 
his hybrid view of both naturism (i.e., reducing the nature-nurture pickle 
to the former’s standpoint) and nurturism (conversely reducing it to the 
latter) not only successfully avoids the extremes and reductionisms 
of (cognitivist) rationalism and (noncognitivist) culturalism – such as 
eliminative materialism and postmodernism –, but turns out to offer 
a more defensible account of social epistemic features and “social 
pathologies” than most analytical, social epistemologists (e.g. Goldman, 
Parfit) and critical theorists (habermas, honneth) have achieved thus 
far. I have argued that Damasio, Prinz, and Searle, among others, have 
succeeded in showing that the social brain rather than the solipsist mind 
is what must ultimately account for a scientifically informed theory of 
consciousness, as mental representations of a given stimulus located at 
an intermediate level of processing become conscious through attention. 
The semantic-ontological correlation comes thus full circle vis à vis its 
networking with language and subjectivity. As Prinz felicitously put it in 
his neoempiricist, reconstructive theory of emotions: “Moral psychology 
entails facts about moral ontology, and a sentimental psychology can entail 
a subjectivist ontology” (PRINz, 2004b, p. 8). After all, the descriptive and 
experimental dimensions of most experiments fail to provide for such a 
moral justification, insofar as causality or causation cannot be taken for 
granted or satisfy ought-like normative claims –since not every correlation 
turns out to be causal. 
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